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Abstract 
Primate facial expression has long been studied within a framework of emotion that has heavily inﬂuenced both theoretical 
approaches and scientiﬁc methods. For example, our understanding of the adaptive function and cognition of facial expression is 
tied to the assumption that facial expression is accompanied by an emotional internal state, which is decipherable by others. 
Here, we challenge this view and instead support the alternative that facial expression should also be conceptualised as an 
indicator of future behaviour as opposed to current emotional state alone (Behavioural Ecology View, Fridlund, 1994). We also 
advocate the use of standardised, objective methodology (Facial Action Coding System, FACS) to avoid making assumptions 
about the underlying emotional state of animals producing facial expressions. We argue that broadening our approach to facial 
expression in this way will open new avenues to explore the underlying neurobiology, cognition and evolution of facial 
communication in both human and non-human primates. 
 
1. Introduction 
Scientiﬁc progress is achieved through building on frameworks that others have established. Such 
cumulative processes are key to human productivity. However, dominant ideas can become entrenched 
and inhibit the ﬁeld from moving in alternative, or even complementary, directions. Primate (including 
human) facial expression has long been studied as synonymous with emotion; which, we argue, can inhibit 
scientists from exploring the phenomenon of facial expression fully. Several landmark ﬁndings (e.g. 
referential vocalisations: Seyfarth et al., 1980) would not have been achieved if the notion of a strict 
separation between human language and animal communication was not challenged, and replaced with a 
continuum. Likewise, we argue it is crucial to consider (and challenge) the bedrock on which the study of 
primate facial expressions is currently standing. 
 
2. The emotional framework and its limitations 
The classiﬁcation of animal signals as emotional or cognitive has existed for a long time, particularly as 
scientists have tried to identify aspects of animal communication that might rely on cognition in a similar 
way to human language. However, the tendency to analyse animal signals as either one or the other, 
although common, has been questioned as overly simplistic by several scientists (Watson et al., 2015; 
Wheeler and Fischer, 2012). Despite calls for an alternative Behavioural Ecology View (Fridlund, 1994), 
where facial expressions are considered in terms of their likely function in social interaction, a strong link 
between emotion and animal facial expression has been made since Darwin’s (1872) seminal work “The 
Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals”. Darwin’s observations of similarity between the 
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behaviour that humans and non-human animals produce in similar social contexts, lead him to conclude 
that psychology as well as morphology is continuous between species. Darwin was also heavily inﬂuenced 
by Duchenne’s experimental induction of facial movements in humans (Duchenne, 1862), and, like 
Duchenne, considered facial expressions to be readouts of internal emotional state. Importantly, Darwin 
did not consider facial expressions to necessarily be functional adaptations, a fact often missed by modern 
researchers (Barrett, 2011; Fridlund, 1994). Instead, Darwin thought that expressions are instinctual 
reﬂexes (or learned associations) of emotion that are often vestigial from an evolutionary perspective. 
Darwin did consider the communicative aspect of facial expressions, but only in the sense that the felt 
emotion can be understood by observers, and not why this might be functional. There is a large body of 
work conﬁrming that facial expressions are indeed associated with felt emotion (Levenson et al., 1990), yet 
this focus on the proximate mechanisms of facial expressions is highly pervasive and now dominates over 
consideration of ultimate function. There are functionalist accounts of facial expressions, but some focus 
on the beneﬁts to the individual when experiencing the emotion, such as the physiological regulatory 
function of facial expressions. For example, Susskind et al. (2008) suggested that human fear expressions 
function to prepare individuals to cope with threat. They demonstrated that the typical expression of fear 
allowed participants to have a larger visual ﬁeld and faster eye movement, as well as an increase in nasal 
volume and air velocity during inspiration. The authors explained that these adjustments could facilitate 
the detection and escape from a threat. In contrast, the disgust face led to the opposite pattern, 
minimising sensory input (Susskind et al., 2008), which they argue functions to block aversive stimuli. 
Shariff and Tracy (2011) proposed that where a social communication function of facial expression does 
exist, this is likely to be a secondary function exapted from physiologically adapted origins. Shariff and 
Tracey’s two stage model of the evolution of emotional expressions puts the expresser of emotion as the 
central ﬁgure, and the observer of the expression as beneﬁtting later and indirectly. The authors argue that 
facial expressions initially evolved as components of the emotional response that function to prepare the 
body to respond. Socially complex animals then gained additional ﬁtness beneﬁts from communicating 
important social information. For example, pride and shame are thought to help individuals navigate social 
hierarchies (Shariff and Tracy, 2011). 
This model for facial expression evolution is a worthy attempt at reconciling emotional and 
communicative views of expression. However, while it is attractive for humans it does not work as well 
when taking a comparative approach. Fear, for example, can be used to illustrate this point. Fear as a 
feeling state is unlikely to be unique to humans as 1) physiological correlates of fear can be seen in many 
other animals (Panksepp, 1990) and 2) it makes adaptive sense for animals to experience a feeling state 
that helps them avoid threats. However, the facial expression associated with fear in humans is not shared 
with other animals. Many other facial expressions do have clear counterparts in other animals, such as the 
expressions of smiling and laughing (Van Hoof and Hinde, 1972), food aversion (Steiner et al., 2001) and 
possibly anger (Parr et al., 2010) but not fear. If the function of the human facial expression of fear is to 
widen the eyes and prepare the individual to cope with threat, this could also be adaptive for other 
animals, particularly those whose faces are encumbered more so than the relatively hairless and browless 
human face. If so, why is this same facial expression not seen in other animals? It could be because the 
primary function of the fear facial expression in humans is not the physiological regulatory function, but 
instead the signal function afforded by the increased exposure of the sclera. Sclera is a characteristic 
feature of human eyes and is much less salient in other animals (including other primates: Kobayashi and 
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Kohshima, 2001), and the detection of sclera is key to the perception of fear facial expressions in humans 
(Whalen et al., 2004). One reason that other animals might not have evolved fear expressions, is that it 
could be maladaptive to expose vulnerable internal states such as fear to others. Many animal societies are 
based on systems of competition rather than cooperation (Clutton-Brock, 2016), and it might only be in the 
context of cooperation that fear signals evolve. Thus, fear expressions (as well as other signs of weakness 
such as pain, or frustration: Waller et al., 2014) could be absent in many species which are not based on 
cooperation. Humans are unusual in the high level of cooperation they exhibit between both related and 
unrelated individuals (Tomasello, 2008). Thus, fear facial expressions may have evolved in humans due to 
the adaptive value in communicating fear to others in order to receive support, and not primarily as 
physiological regulators. In which case, Shariff and Tracey’s (2011) two stage model for the evolution of 
facial expressions is less convincing. Of course, it could also be adaptive to express fear in competitive 
situations, for example to reduce the risk of aggression. In this case, however, if there is a fear expression 
in nonhuman primates, it is not anatomically homologous to the human facial expression of fear. 
A primary focus on the proximate (emotional) mechanisms of facial expression is limiting for 
additional reasons, particularly when conducting comparative research. First, and most simply, we cannot 
be sure if another individual’s experience of emotion is the same as one’s own, and so in some 
circumstances scientists might attribute emotion incorrectly. This is particularly risky in comparative 
research, where non-human emotion could be very different to human emotion, but could also be the case 
when dealing with nonlinguistic humans such as infants. Thus, even if the felt emotion does have 
important self-regulatory function in non-human animals, there could still be a fair amount of guesswork 
before working out what that might be. Second, the emotion thought to underlie an expression is often 
used as part of the description of that expression. For example, primate facial expressions are often 
described using subjective emotional terms, such as fear grimace. These emotional descriptions may or 
may not be correct, but regardless can affect our perception of the appearance and morphology of facial 
expressions (Waller et al., 2007), potentially rendering our descriptions inaccurate. Third, without objective 
descriptions focussing on the morphology of an expression, rather than the emotional content, whether 
scientists are referring to the same phenomena when discussing these expressions is unclear. If the goal is 
to make unbiased scientiﬁc descriptions of facial expressions, clarity and objectivity are crucial. Finally, and 
most importantly, the premise that facial expressions are emotional sets them apart from other modalities 
of primate communication, such as gestures and vocalisations (Liebal et al., 2013; Slocombe et al., 2010). 
For example, in comparison to vocalisations, more attention is paid to the producer of facial expression 
rather than the receiver, and studies are less likely to be experimental and aim to quantify the social 
consequences of the signals (Liebal et al., 2013; Slocombe et al., 2010). Scientists might be focussing more 
on the expresser of the facial expressions actions precisely because they are assuming that the function is 
physiological and regulatory rather than communicative. Any additional (or even primary) function 
evidenced by quantifying the response in a receiver (Guilford and Dawkins, 1991) could be overlooked 
within such a framework. However, it is also possible that (as with gestures) the role of the receiver in 
facial expression is simply difﬁcult to test (but see Micheletta et al., 2015; Parr et al., 1998; Waller et al., 
2016) in contrast to vocalisations (Fischer et al., 2013). In sum, for each primate communicative modality 
we have more or less data on different aspects of the phenomena, rendering comparisons between 
modalities problematic. Our broad generalised conclusions about what is and is not characteristic of 
primate facial expression is not based on a complete dataset. In short, primate facial expressions are 
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studied more in terms of their proximate, mechanistic properties and less in terms of their ultimate, 
evolutionary and communicative function (sensu Tinbergen, 1963). Of course, all levels of Tinbergen’s 
famous four questions deserve attention and any strong focus on one at the expense of the others leaves 
an incomplete picture. 
 
3. Moving beyond emotion—objectivity 
We argue that in order to build a more complete picture of primate facial expression we need to decouple 
it from a framework where it is considered synonymous with emotion (as suggested by Fridlund, 1994). 
Yet, the study of facial expression has become so intertwined with the study of emotion that it can be hard 
to conceive of a way forward for research without combining the two. We suggest that there are two 
particularly important steps we need to take to release facial expression from emotion. 
First, it is important to avoid vague emotional terms for facial expressions, as we might overlook 
important characteristics about the exact form of the expression. For example, primate facial expressions 
are rarely static and invariant and are thus not always suited to lumping into broad categories. Facial 
expressions can be composed of multiple components which occur dynamically (different onsets, offsets, 
durations) over a period of time. For example, the crested macaque (Macaca nigra) lipsmack display has 
been described as a composite and multimodal signal in published repertoires (Thierry et al., 2000) but 
until recently, the role of these different components had not been analysed. Micheletta et al. (2013) 
investigated whether the speciﬁc composition of the lipsmack affected the social outcomes of interactions 
when lipsmacks were produced. Lipsmacks composed of both vocal (soft grunt) and visual (lip movement, 
scalp retraction, teeth exposure and/or head turn) components were more likely to result in afﬁliative 
interactions, demonstrating a level of complexity in the production and role of the lipsmack than 
previously understood. Emotional labels are not necessary to describe this expression and it is not clear 
how this would be helpful when considering the form and function of this particular facial expression. 
Instead, an objective system for the quantiﬁcation of animal facial expressions is necessary and can 
be found in the Facial Action Coding System (FACS: Ekman et al., 2002). Initially developed for humans, 
FACS has been modiﬁed for use with various primate species: chimpanzees (ChimpFACS: Vick et al., 2007), 
macaques (Julle-Danière et al., 2015; Parr et al., 2011), gibbons (Waller et al., 2012) and orangutans (Caeiro 
et al., 2012). FACS is a standardised, objective method for recording facial movements based on the 
underlying anatomy (see Fig. 1), and reduces facial expressions to component movements, including 
dynamic and extremely subtle aspects if needed. Importantly, there is no need to use emotional terms 
when describing facial expressions using FACS, which allows scientists to explore facial expressions in novel 
ways. Using this objective methodology, we demonstrated that orangutan facial expressions can meet 
some of the criteria for intentional production (Waller et al., 2015), a cognitive characteristic often 
attributed only to primate gesture (eg. Liebal et al., 2013; Pika, 2008) and only recently to primate 
vocalisations (Schel et al., 2013). Using FACS to record the components of the open mouth faces used 
during play interactions (e.g whether the jaw was dropped slightly [AU26] or stretched open [AU27], 
whether the upper lip was retracted [AU10] and whether the lip corners were retracted [AU12]), we 
demonstrated that the facial expressions were more intense and more complex when the expresser was 
facing the play partner. Sensitivity to the attentional stance of another is a commonly used criterion for 
intentional production of primate communication. As primate behaviours are often categorised as 
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underpinned by either intentional or emotional production (Tomasello, 2008), we argued that an 
emotional approach to facial expression was inhibiting scientists from testing for intentionality in facial 
expression production. Crucially, using objective methods such as FACS makes it easier to conduct 
quantitative studies such as this. 
 
4. Moving beyond emotion—a predictive framework 
The second step we need to take to release facial expression from emotion, is to think more clearly about 
what facial expressions are actually for. Classically, facial expressions are seen as the expression of emotion 
experienced by the producer of the expression. This may be one characteristic of facial expressions, but 
this deﬁnition alone is not sufﬁcient to help researchers understand both the evolution and function of 
facial expressions because it does not address the effect facial expression have on receivers. Here, we 
advocate an alternative view proposed by Alan Fridlund in 1994, the Behavioural Ecology View. Within this 
perspective, facial expressions are not just as indicators of current emotional state, but are also indicators 
of future behaviour. 
There is evidence that facial expressions can affect the decisions made by the individuals’ who 
witness them. As early as 1971, Miller (1971) demonstrated this phenomenon using a novel experimental 
design. A macaque was shown a warning sign prior to being exposed to an electric shock. The macaque 
reacted by displaying a silent-bared teeth facial expression. An observer macaque was able to use this 
signal to press a lever and therefore avoid exposure to the upcoming electric shock themselves. Thus, the 
facial expression acted as an indication of forthcoming events (allowing the witness to anticipate what 
might happen next). More recently, Buttelmann et al. (2009) tested the ability of chimpanzees, bonobos, 
gorillas and orangutans to understand others’ facial expressions. When presented with food hidden under 
two containers, great apes were able to select the food baited container based on the target and valence 
of the human experimenter’s facial expressions (Buttelmann et al., 2009). In the ﬁnal experiment, the apes’ 
understand that the experimenter had subsequently eaten the food they had reacted positively towards, 
and so choose the alternative box (which is still baited with food). Thus, the subjects’ could predict the 
experimenter’s behaviour based on his facial expression. In a similar type of experiment, capuchin 
monkeys (Cebus apella) modiﬁed their behaviour in response to the facial expressions of a conspeciﬁc 
(Morimoto and Fujita, 2011, 2012). A demonstrator capuchin was presented with boxes containing stimuli 
which reliably elicited either a positive, a neutral or a negative response. An observing capuchin witnessed 
the reaction of the demonstrator, who was then given access to the same box (see Fig. 2). The observer 
modiﬁed their response to the boxes based on the facial expressions of the demonstrator. Speciﬁcally, the 
capuchins reached for the box for longer when the conspeciﬁc demonstrator displayed eyebrow ﬂashes, an 
afﬁliative facial expression often followed by physical contact. Therefore, the capuchin used the facial 
expressions of a conspeciﬁc to predict whether the box contained favourable stimuli. 
The novel and important conclusion from these experiments is that facial expressions can provide 
useful information about hidden or unseen objects in the environment. Thus, these experiments show that 
facial expressions can be useful to social observers. However, facial expressions are usually directed at 
conspeciﬁcs in the context of social interactions, and not towards inanimate objects.  
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Fig. 1. A facial expression coded using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). a) Neutral face with facial muscles indicated. b) 
Facial muscles contracted and therefore presence of Action Units (AUs) coded. FACS modiﬁed for use with different species are 
based on the human FACS (Ekman et al., 2002). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Expressions modify future behaviour. Adapted from Morimoto and Fujita (2012). a) A demonstrator monkey directed 
expressions towards one of two boxes, which contained either a positive (apple) or negative (dog puppet) item. The observer 
monkey could not see the contents, but could see the expressions of the demonstrator. Only one box was open. b) After the 
object was shown to the demonstrator, the observer could then choose one of the boxes. When the demonstrator displayed an 
expression with a positive valence, the observer was more likely to choose the open box. In contrast, after an expression with a 
negative valence, the observer was more likely to avoid the open box. 
 
In which case, the ability to choose objects based on observed facial expression should be generalizable to 
social circumstances. Facial expressions should also function as indicators of likely outcomes during social 
interactions. In a sense, this perspective is building on a classic approach to communicative events as 
ritualised behavioural intention movements (e.g. Hinde, 1966), which although highly established 
throughout behavioural biology, may have been overshadowed by the ubiquitous emotional framework. 
Using a variant of the match-to-sample task, we tested crested macaques’ ability to associate video 
sequences of social interactions to their most likely outcome (Waller et al., 2016). We ﬁrst trained the 
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macaques to match video sequences of behaviour with a corresponding outcome (e.g. sexual presentation 
with eventual mating), using various controls and alternative outcomes. One macaque successfully passed 
this training stage during which only the correct choices were reinforced. We then tested the macaque 
with novel video sequences showing one individual approaching another individual. We manipulated the 
last frame to show either a neutral face, a silent bared-teeth face, an open-mouth threat or an openmouth 
bared teeth scream face, and then presented the macaque with different social outcomes to choose 
between. The macaque chose different outcomes depending on the facial expression (see Fig. 3). The 
macaque chose a peaceful outcome more often after seeing the approaching macaque with a bared-teeth 
(more than any other expression). In contrast, the macaque chose a conﬂict outcome (injury) most often 
after the approach ended with a neutral expression. This last result most likely reﬂects the potential for 
conﬂict when no information is provided by the approaching individual. Interestingly, all facial expressions 
seemed to indicate reduced likelihood for conﬂict. Although this might initially seem counter-intuitive, the 
function of communicative signals in the agonistic context is to resolve the conﬂict without having to 
escalate to physical aggression (Clutton-brock and Albon, 1979; Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2000), and so 
this outcome still ﬁts with the overall proposal. Although fundamentally a proof of concept, this kind of 
study should facilitate future investigation of the processing of facial expression by receivers. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Predictive value of facial expression in social interaction. Taken from Waller et al. (2016). A subject was presented with a 
video sequence of one unknown individual approaching another on a touchscreen (1). The ﬁnal frame of this video remained on 
the touchscreen, and one individual in the image was manipulated to either display: (2a) a neutral face (N), (2b) an open-mouth 
threat (OM), (2c) a scream face (SC), or (2d) a bared-teeth face (BT). Once the subject touched this image, a choice of social 
outcomes was then presented. This was either a (3a) grooming, or (3b) injury outcome. The percentage of choice for each facial 
expression is shown on the right panel. The dotted line represents the expected values derived from the Chi-squared analysis. 
The presence of all facial expressions reduced the likelihood of the subject predicting a conﬂict outcome. This ﬁgure is 
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
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5. Predictive framework: cognition 
We argue that increasing focus on the predictive value of facial expression will open new avenues to 
explore the underlying cognition, neurobiology, and evolution of facial expression in both human and non-
human primates. If facial expressions can be used by the receivers to adjust their behaviour based on the 
likely future behaviour of the sender, this raises new questions about how facial expressions are perceived 
and processed by the receiver. We know that several species of primate can accurately categorise facial 
expressions based on appearance (e.g. Parr and Heintz, 2009), emotional valence (Parr, 2001), the 
presence of salient features (Parr et al., 2008) or their functional similarities (Micheletta et al., 2015). 
However, if processing facial expressions involves a predictive aspect, this may involve an additional layer 
of possibly more complex cognitive mechanisms, and facial expression may start to be seen as a more 
central factor in social cognition. 
If facial expression observers can extract more from facial expressions than their temporary and 
ﬁxed emotional content, this might also contradict some current views of facial expression and how they 
are ‘understood’ by recievers, which is often seen as a largely automatic and reﬂexive process. For 
example, the most basic mechanism proposed to be involved in processing facial expressions is 
spontaneous, reﬂexive emotional contagion (Hatﬁeld et al., 1994), in which emotion is a central concept. In 
this process, the receiver automatically experiences the same psychological state as the sender. This 
emotional contagion has been linked to rapid facial mimicry, the rapid (<1 s) production of the same facial 
expression by the receiver (Dimberg et al., 2000). Rapid facial mimicry has been documented in 
chimpanzees (Davila-Ross et al., 2011), orangutans (Davila Ross et al., 2008) and geladas (Mancini et al., 
2013a) in the context of play. In both chimpanzees and geladas (Davila-Ross et al., 2011; Mancini et al., 
2013b), play bouts including rapid mimicry of play faces were longer, possibly because it reduces the 
uncertainty regarding the ongoing interaction. In this context, rapid facial mimicry seems to facilitate the 
exchange of information and therefore the coordination of playful interactions, which is thought to allow 
primates to improve their social skills as well as functioning to establish and maintain social bonds. In 
negatively valenced contexts such as aggression, reﬂexive emotional contagion could also be advantageous 
if it triggers physiological regulation processes (e.g. fear expressions facilitating escape from threat: 
Susskind et al., 2008). However studies documenting the occurrence of emotional contagion in primates 
appear to be restricted to the context of play. Of course, this does not mean that contagion does not occur 
in other contexts or in response to other facial expressions, but rather that researchers have not yet 
extended their investigation to other contexts and expressions. However, in one study, Mancini et al. 
(2013a) have documented the lack of rapid facial mimicry in response to geladas’ lip-smacks, another facial 
expression emitted in positive social interactions. 
Despite being widely studied, the contagion model is questionable (Dezecache et al., 2015). From a 
functional perspective, it is unlikely that the default response to another’s facial expression should always 
be the same as the sender’s. In fact, responses to facial expressions often vary in light of several social and 
contextual factors and are rarely identical to the sender’s (with the exception of play). For example, threats 
might not be responded to in the same way when they are observed in dominant individuals and 
subordinates, or when performed by inand out-group members (Hess et al., 2009). In fact, in many species, 
facial threats are often responded to with formal signals of subordination and/or avoidance rather than 
  
9 
facial threats (e.g. De Waal and Luttrell, 1985). Primates are also very good at following the gaze of 
conspeciﬁcs (Tomasello et al., 1998), which means that they can adopt different responses to facial 
expressions depending on who (or what) is the target of the facial expression. Of course, by-standers do 
not necessarily react in the same way as the actual target of the facial expression, which makes sense from 
a functional perspective. 
There are also a number of instances where the behaviour of the receiver differs in response to the 
same expression depending on social context. In several species of macaques, the well-known silent-bared 
teeth expression can be produced in response to very different stimuli. It can be produced in aggressive 
contexts where it generally triggers the end of the conﬂict, or in peaceful contexts where it can lead to 
grooming or mating (Duboscq et al., 2013; Thierry et al., 1989). If individuals understand the facial 
expressions of others by experiencing the same emotion, how does this facilitate such complex and ﬂexible 
responses? The contagion model is simply not sufﬁcient to explain how facial expressions are detected and 
processed when facial expressions are embedded in complex social interactions with various possible social 
outcomes. In sum, the contagion model may provide a possible mechanism by which receivers can acquire 
information regarding the psychological state of senders, but it does not explain if/how receivers integrate 
context and can then act on this information, particularly if they need to respond ﬂexibly. In contrast, in a 
predictive framework such as the Behavioural Ecology View (Fridlund, 1994), the facial expressions of 
others are seen as indications of their likely future behaviour, observers are not limited to responding in 
the same way as the sender (either by experiencing the same emotion, or experiencing physiological 
regulation). Instead, they can respond depending on what is most beneﬁcial to them as an individual, in 
light of the useful information that someone else is likely to act in a certain way. However, if this predictive 
framework is correct, it suggests that an extra (or simply different) layer of cognition could be at work, 
which forces us to rethink how facial expressions are processed. 
In order to free facial expression from an emotional framework, we need to embed it in the social 
interaction from the start. Currently, facial expressions are somewhat isolated from the contexts and 
dynamics in which they occur. This is not the case with all facial movements, which we argue has a 
profound effect on how the phenomenon is studied. Gaze direction, for example, is an aspect of facial 
expression (in the sense that it is a facial feature deﬁned by its relation to other facial features) that is not 
considered to be intrinsically emotional. Instead, gaze direction is considered to provide information: when 
gaze is directed towards something (or someone), it can provide information to others about the object of 
the sender’s attention (if observers have the ability to follow the actor’s gaze). As such, responses to gaze 
cues are often connected to the suite of skills considered to be building blocks toward theory of mind and 
empathy e.g. gaze following tasks are included in the widely used battery of tasks to test the extent of 
theory of mind in primates: (Herrmann et al., 2007). Crucially, gaze cues mean less when isolated from the 
social interaction; it is only when the object of gaze is included in the phenomenon that they become 
meaningful and we truly understand the cognition associated with interpreting them. Likewise, with facial 
expression, perhaps it is only through embedding facial expression back in the social interaction that we 
can truly understand the underlying cognition. 
If facial expressions can be used to predict the likely behaviour of others, and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly, what cognition might underlie this? Responses could still be reﬂexive, although the likelihood 
of this is reduced when we consider the vast number of factors that could contribute to a vast range of 
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possible outcomes. A mandatory response to facial expressions might not make as much sense as a more 
cognitive, ﬂexible response. There is ample evidence documenting primates’ ability to adjust their 
behaviour depending on the behaviour of others (reviewed in Rosati and Hare, 2012), and several 
mechanisms have been put forward to explain their ability to do so. It is possible that individuals develop a 
set of behavioural rules after repeatedly facing the same or similar situation during their existence. At the 
other extreme, it is also possible that individuals attribute mental states to others and are capable of 
reasoning about those mental states to achieve the best outcome using a full-blown, human-like theory of 
mind. Although currently there are very few intermediate mechanisms, a few alternatives have been 
proposed recently (Butterﬁll and Apperly, 2013; Whiten, 2013). There is a lively ongoing debate regarding 
these cognitive abilities (Heyes, 2015), and our goal here is not to contribute to this debate by favouring 
one alternative over the other, but to encourage others to envisage what the mediating role of facial 
expressions in this process could be and what it could entail. 
 
6. Predictive framework: neurobiology 
Our understanding of the neurobiology underlying facial expression production and perception is 
extensive. However, revisiting the framework with which we study facial expressions could open new 
avenues. We know that the neural network for facial expression systems spans over half of the neocortex 
and includes many bilateral regions of the primate brain, and that the core systems are situated in the 
occipitotemporal regions of the visual cortex in humans (Haxby et al., 2000). The key structures involved 
include those in the temporal lobe, such as superior temporal sulcus and the interior temporal cortex, as 
well as the amygdala and the premotor cortex (Gothard et al., 2007; Haxby et al., 2002; Liebal et al., 2013). 
There is increasing evidence for similar neural processes in non-human primates (Parr and Hecht, 2011), 
suggesting a functional homology of face and expression perception throughout the primates (Liebal et al., 
2013). However, our understanding and interpretation of these neural systems, and the function of the 
neural structures involved during the perception of facial expressions are derived through our current 
knowledge of what facial expressions are and what they do. By constraining our understanding of facial 
expressions within an emotional framework, we may be subsequently constraining our understanding of 
the neurobiological systems we use to process them. 
If facial expressions are not only communicating the emotional state of an individual but instead, 
information about the intentions and future behaviour of the actor, this may lead to a different 
interpretation of the systems which we currently attribute to the production and perception of emotion. 
The study of the neural mechanisms for emotional perception for example, is often approached through 
the presentation of emotionally salient stimuli, of which images and videos of facial expressions are often 
included (Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 2003). Different neuronal responses in the 
amygdala during the perception of different facial expressions have been recorded, with happy and fearful 
faces eliciting quantiﬁably different neural patterns when observed by humans (Morris et al., 1996). But, 
because of the assumption that these expressions are a product of their corresponding affective state, 
these neural changes tend to be directly linked to the perception of emotion; where the intensity of neural 
response is attributed to the intensity of the emotion felt by the displaying individual. Instead, it could be 
these neural changes are not related to the salience of faces, but the urgency in which an individual needs 
to assess another’s intentions and prepare an appropriate response. The adaptive value of responding to 
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fearful or aggressive expressions is likely to be greater than that of responding to happy faces, and it would 
be sensible that the neural responses would reﬂect this. Indeed, the role of the amygdala in interpreting 
facial expressions has long been explored, and is currently seen less as detecting emotion, and more as 
interpreting ambiguous social information in context (Hoffman et al., 2007). When examining the neural 
areas associated with facial expression, we may be uncovering importantneural mechanisms 
whichcontribute to other mental abilities such as affective forecasting and behaviour reading (Krebs and 
Dawkins, 1978; Wilson and Gilbert, 2005). So, for us to be able to comprehend and interpret the 
relationship between the neural processes and function of facial expression, it is imperative that we ﬁrst 
take a step back and attempt to fully understand why these behaviours exist to begin with. 
 
7. Predictive framework: evolution 
The ability to attend and respond to the emotions of others, although an arguably adaptive strategy in the 
maintenance of complex social systems (Clay and de Waal, 2013), may not represent the most 
parsimonious explanation for the evolution of facial expression in animals. Instead, the ability to avoid 
harmful situations by predicting the likely behaviour of others could impose an enormous selection 
pressure on the evolution of behaviour throughout the animal kingdom. For example, signals that allow 
individuals to avoid interspeciﬁc and intraspeciﬁc conﬂict are extremely useful adaptations (eg. Alarm 
calling, Seyfarth et al., 1980; Reconciliation, De Waal and van Roosmalen, 1979). If facial expression 
themselves also reduce the likelihood of future conﬂict by allowing an individual to predict the future 
behaviour of others which experimental data is beginning to suggest (Buttelmann et al., 2009; Morimoto 
and Fujita, 2011, 2012; Waller et al., 2016), this could be a much simpler explanation for their selection 
then the perception and processing of complex emotions alone. 
Attempts to promote an adaptationist approach to the evolution of human facial expression is not 
new, and have been made eloquently by several scholars (e.g. Fridlund, 1994; Schmidt and Cohn, 2001), 
Attempts have also been made to reconcile approaches between the human and non-human animal 
literature (e.g. Fridlund, 1994; Waller and Micheletta, 2013). But still, a tendency to focus on emotion 
reading as an explanation for the evolution of facial expression remains a dominant comparative approach 
(De Waal, 2011; Shariff and Tracy, 2011). It could be, of course, that information regarding both the 
individual’s emotional state and their future intentions have inﬂuenced the evolution of facial expression, 
and so it may be just as problematic to ignore emotion altogether. By bridging the gap between these two 
schools of thought, of both the functional and causal aspects of facial expression, we could develop an 
improved framework to fully understand these behaviours (Tinbergen, 1963). In many ways the goal of 
Shariff and Tracy (2011) is also to integrate the functional and causal aspects of facial expression, which 
should be commended. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In sum, the vast majority of non-human primates exhibit facial movements as part of their behavioural 
repertoire. In accordance with scientiﬁc tradition, these are often labelled facial expressions and are 
thought to reﬂect the emotional state of the sender. The term facial expression invokes an emotional 
approach as there is an intrinsic assumption that something internal to the actor is being expressed. 
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However, we argue that this emotional framework is limiting the ﬁeld from moving forward to gain a 
deeper understanding of the form and function of facial expression within social interaction. We argue that 
a focus on the emotion centres scientiﬁc attention on the actor of the behaviour (rather than the wider 
social interaction), on proximate mechanisms, and crucially, on the present. We advocate an alternative, a 
predictive framework where facial expressions can be conceptualised as indicators of the actor’s likely 
future behaviour (Fridlund, 1994). In line with a more classical ethological perspective, this framework sees 
facial expressions more as ritualised intention movements that can be used by others to gain useful 
information about potential future events and to reduce uncertainty. Rethinking facial expressions in this 
way allows us to embed the signals back into the social interaction and consider them in relation to other 
individuals, other behaviours, and of course other communicative events. Such an integrative approach has 
been integral in advancing our understanding of many aspects of biology, particularly communicative 
systems (e.g. communication; Partan and Marler, 1999; sensory perception; Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 
2006). We propose that the production and perception of facial expression not only exist as part of a 
coordinated exchange of information, but also as part of an embodied multimodal system, where many 
aspects of communication, emotional experience, and cognition are working together during social 
interaction. 
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